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NEPA REQUIREMENTS FOR PRIVATE PROJECTS 
David J. H ayes* 
James A. Hourihan* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When Congress enacted the National Environmental Policy Act 
("NEPA")1 in 1969, it required that all major federal actions that 
might have an impact on the environment be preceded by a thorough 
review and analysis of potential environmental impacts.2 Because 
Congress limited NEPA to cases involving "major federal actions," 
Congress anticipated that the statute would apply to projects under-
taken by the federal government that might have an impact on the 
environment. 3 In the legislative history of the Act, for example, 
Congress emphasized that all federal agencies must complete an 
environmental analysis before going forward with their programs. 4 
Although Congress anticipated that NEP A would apply to feder-
ally-financed projects, the broad language of the statute lIas ex-
tended NEPA's reach to privately-financed projects. 5 Despite the 
fact that private projects do not appear to qualify as "major federal 
actions" that require environmental analysis under NEPA, the proj-
* Copyright © 1985 by David J. Hayes and James A. Hourihan. Messrs. Hourihan and 
Hayes are partners in the Washington, D.C. law firm of Hogan & Hartson. They have 
represented a number of clients in environmental matters. Most recently, they have repre-
sented a major coal slurry venture in NEPA litigation. 
142 U.S.C. § 4331. 
2 NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). 
3 See generally H. Rep. No. 91-378, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2751. 
4 See Conf. Rep. No. 91-765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 2767,2770-71. 
5 See, e.g., Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Information, Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 
1973) ("NEPA's impact statement procedure has been held to apply where a federal agency 
approves a lease of land to private parties, grants licenses and permits to private parties, or 
approves and funds state highway projects. In each of these instances, the federal agency 
took action affecting the environment in the sense that the agency made a decision which 
permitted some other party - private or governmental - to take action.") 
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ects often must obtain some federal approvals before they can go 
forward. 6 To illustrate, major pipeline projects often must obtain 
federal right-of-way permits prior to construction. 7 
Increasingly, courts have characterized the granting of permits 
for privately-funded projects as "major federal actions" that trigger 
NEP A requirements. 8 Thus, for example, the granting of federal 
permits for rights-of-way, leasing arrangements, water discharges, 
and dredging operations may constitute sufficient "federal action" to 
trigger NEPA's EIS requirements for privately-funded projects. 9 In 
addition, loan guarantees or direct federal assistance may sufficiently 
"federalize" private projects so as to initiate NEP A obligations. 10 As 
a result, corporations that undertake large development projects 
increasingly become enmeshed in disputes arising under NEP A. 
Unfortunately, because NEPA's regulations and early case law 
were developed under the assumption that NEP A applied to large 
federal projects financed by the taxpaying public, the regulations 
and court interpretations often provide a poor "fit" for private cor-
porate projects. To illustrate, NEPA's requirement that federal de-
cisionmakers complete a full evaluation of all possible alternatives in 
an EIS so that a federal decisionmaker can choose to take a different 
actionll may not apply with equal force to a private corporate deci-
sion to pursue a specific project. Once a private company has decided 
to undertake a large project involving the transportation of coal in 
a slurry pipeline, for example, evaluation of alternative transporta-
tion modes (e.g., increased railroad transportation of coal) is oflittle 
relevance to the company that has made an economic commitment 
to implementing coal slurry technology. Under such circumstances, 
it is not reasonable to allow a federal official who is reviewing a 
right-of-way request to insist that the company abandon its coal 
6 See, e.g., Dalsis v. Hill, 424 F. Supp. 784 (W.D.N. Y. 1976) (approval of renewal project); 
Conservation Council of N.C. v. Costanzo, 398 F. Supp. 653 (E.D.N.C. 1975) (wetlands 
pennit). 
7 In a case in which the authors participated, for example, a proposed 1,400-mile coal slurry 
pipeline was required to obtain a right-of-way permit to cross approximately 40 miles of 
federal lands. (A coal slurry pipeline involves the pulverization of coal into small particles, 
mixing the particles with water in a slurry mixture, and pumping the slurry through an 
underground pipeline. Once delivered, the water is removed from the slurry and the coal is 
ready for use.) 
8 See generally Mandelker, NEPA Law and Litigation § 8:16 (1984). 
9 See generally Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856,870-72 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd on other 
grounds, Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976). 
10 See, e.g., Investment Syndicates, Inc. v. Richmond, 318 F. Supp. 1038 (D. Or. 1970) 
(funding for power transmission line qualifies as major federal action). 
11 NEPA § 102(2)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E). 
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slurry project because the federal official would prefer increased 
railroad transportation of coal. 12 
Similarly, while NEP A properly requires that federal officials in-
clude a cost-benefit analysis in an EIS so that federal officials can 
evaluate the cost impacts of taxpayer-financed projects,13 it makes 
no sense for private companies that have committed the private 
financial resources to a project to justify the economics of a proposed 
venture that they have already agreed to underwrite. If a consortium 
of companies is willing to finance the proposed $2 billion ETSI coal 
slurry project,14 for example, a federal official who is reviewing a 
right-of-way request should not have the authority to insist that the 
companies demonstrate in an EIS that the money will be well spent 
before granting a right-of-way permit. 
In addition to subjecting private projects to NEPA requirements 
that often do not apply well to privately-financed projects, the ap-
plication of NEP A to such projects opens private parties to abusive 
legal attacks. Using the cause of action provided by NEPA and the 
Administrative Procedure Act, economic competitors incre~singly 
are using NEP A as a means to delay or scuttle projects that would 
erode their competitive position. 15 In a recent case, for example, a 
railroad that is heavily dependent upon coal transportation based a 
suit against a proposed coal slurry pipeline on NEP A, despite the 
fact that the railroad clearly was more interested in the economic 
impact that the private project would have on the railroad's revenues 
than on any environmental impacts. 16 , 
This article addresses the distortions created by application of 
NEPA requirements to privately-financed projects. Based on an 
analysis of NEPA's intended purpose, it proposes that EISs pre-
pared for private projects be more limited in scope than those pre-
pared for public projects. In particular, the article argues in favor 
of tailoring EISs to the special characteristics of private projects 
and dispensing with a cost-benefit analysis or extensive evaluation 
12 For example, a joint venture known as ETSI (Energy Transportation Systems Inc.) 
proposed to build the world's largest coal slurry pipeline from Wyoming to utilities in the mid-
South. The privately-funded venture was based on the application of technology that had been 
developed by the Bechtel Corporation. Nonetheless, the EIS prepared for the ETSI project 
included a number of "alternatives" that ETSI would not have accepted including, for example, 
the "no action" alternative that would have abandoned coal slurry technology in favor of total 
reliance on railroad transportation of coal. 
13 NEPA § 102(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B). 
14 See supra notes 8 & 13. 
15 See infra note 48. 
16 See infra notes 50 & 64. 
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of alternative actions. In addition, the article proposes that courts 
strictly apply standing requirements to insure that the judicial pro-
cess is not abused by economic competitors who rely on NEP A to 
bring suits that are based on economic and not environmental con-
cerns. 
II. THE SCOPE OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS 
PREPARED FOR PRIVATE PROJECTS 
NEPA requires that federal authorities prepare "detailed" EISs 
for all major federal projects that may have an impact on the envi-
ronment. 17 The scope of the analysis that must be included in an EIS 
is wide-ranging, including an analysis of direct and indirect environ-
mental effects,18 potential mitigation measures,19 an analysis of al-
ternative actions and their environmental impacts,20 and an evalua-
tion of the environmental "costs" of proposed actions. 21 Two aspects 
of EISs that raise special difficulty as applied to private projects are 
the analysis of alternatives and the cost-benefit analysis. As ex-
plained below, neither type of analysis should be applied strictly in 
EISs prepared for private projects. 
A. Cost-Benefit Analysis 
NEPA does not require that an EIS include a formal cost-benefit 
analysis. Similarly, the regulations promulgated by the Council of 
Environmental Quality ("CEQ") do not require that such an analysis 
be included in an EIS. Instead, NEPA directs all agencies of the 
federal government to "identify and develop methods and proce-
dures ... which will insure that presently unquantified environmen-
tal amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration in 
decisionmaking along with economic and technical considerations. "22 
The purpose of the provision is to insure that environmental factors 
are given sufficient consideration in relation to the other factors. 23 
It does not demand,. however, that a discussion of these other factors 
be included in the EIS. The relevant NEPA regulation states that 
an EIS is not required to contain a formal cost/benefit analysis: 
17 NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). 
18 See 40 C.F.R. § 150S.S(a) (direct effects); 40 C.F.R. § 150S.S(b) (indirect effects). 
19 NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.14(f), 1502.16(h). 
20 NEPA § 102(2)(C)(iii), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E)(iii). 
21 NEPA § 102(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 102(2)(B). 
22 NEPA § 102(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B). 
23 Robinson v. Knebel, 550 F.2d 422, 426 (Sth Cir. 1977). 
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For purposes of complying with the Act, the weighing of the 
merits and drawbacks of the various alternatives need not be 
displayed in a monetary cost-benefit analysis and should not be 
when there are important qualitative considerations. 24 
65 
Both NEPA and the CEQ regulations anticipate, however, that 
the EIS include some attempt to "weigh" the relative environmental 
impacts of proposed projects. 25 Several courts have interpreted this 
nebulous statutory guidance to require that an EIS include a formal 
cost-benefit analysis assessing the relative environmental and eco-
nomic costs and benefits of a project.26 
Recently, courts have begun to question the often-assumed "re-
quirement" that an environmental impact statement include a cost-
benefit analysis. 27 While an EIS obviously must inform a decision-
maker of the potential environmental ramifications of a proposed 
project, this obligation can be satisfied without an attempt to com-
plete an economic analysis of the proposed project.28 As the Supreme 
Court recently reaffirmed, NEPA does not require that an EIS cover 
every aspect of a proposed action, but only its effects on the physical 
environment: 
The theme of § 102 is sounded by the adjective "environmental": 
NEPA does not require the agency to assess every impact or 
effect of its proposed action, but only the impact or effect on the 
environment. If we were to seize the word "environmental" out 
of its context and give it the broadest possible definition, the 
words "adverse environmental effects" might embrace virtually 
any consequence of a governmental action that some one thought 
"adverse." But we think the context of the statute shows that 
Congress was talking about the physical environment - the 
world around us, so to speak .... Thus, although NEPA states 
24 40 C.F.R. § 1502.23 (1984). 
25 Id. 
26 See, e.g., Columbia Basin Land Protection Ass'n v. Schlesinger, 643 F.2d 585, 593 (9th 
Cir. 1981); lzaak Walton League of America v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346, 377 (D.C. Cir. 1981), 
cert. denied sub nom. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Marsh, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981). 
Most such cases rely on Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy 
Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), which states that "NEPA mandates a rather finely 
tuned and 'systemic' balancing analysis." Id. at 1113. Typically, courts speak of weighing the 
environmental costs of a project against its economic and technical benefits. Izaak Walton 
League of America, 655 F.2d at 377. 
27 See, e.g., Save the Niobrara River Ass'n v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 844, 857 (D. Neb. 1979) 
(NEP A "does not require economic benefits and costs to be included in an environmental 
statement"). 
28 Id.; see also Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1286 (9th Cir. 1974) (ElS can 
serve its intended purposes without a formal and mathematically expressed cost-benefit anal-
ysis). 
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its goals in sweeping terms of human health and welfare, these 
goals are ends that Congress has chosen to pursue by means of 
protecting the physical environment. 29 
The recent Metropolitan Edison30 decision may quell the debate 
about the necessity of completing a cost-benefit analysis in an EIS. 
Whatever the ultimate resolution of this issue insofar as it relates 
to federally-initiated projects, however, it is clear that a cost-benefit 
or related economic analysis has no place in an EIS prepared for a 
private project. Simply put, a public official reviewing a request for 
federal permit approvals should not have the authority to require a 
private party to demonstrate the economic desirability of a project. 
The private party is risking private funds on the project; he should 
have to justify the economics of his proposal to his bankers, not to 
federal officials. 
Several courts agree, and have recognized that the special char-
acter of a privately-funded project makes it peculiarly inappropriate 
for completion of a cost-benefit analysis in an EIS. In Bucks County 
Board of Commissioners v. Interstate Energy CO.,31 for example, 
the "private" nature of a pipeline construction project was decisive 
in the court's ruling that no cost-benefit analysis was required. The 
court elaborated: 
This case does not involve a publicly funded project. The pipeline 
represents a private investment . . . . Plaintiffs have cited no 
case, and I have found none, requiring a cost-benefit analysis 
where a privately funded project is involved. As noted above, 
environmental amenities were given "appropriate consideration" 
in the decisionmaking process. Pursuant to § l02(2)(B) (42 
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B», the EIS isolated, identified, and evaluated, 
among other factors, the probable environmental impacts of the 
project on the natural, man-made, human and economic re-
sources of the area. NEPA requires no more. 32 
29 Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 51 U.S.L.W. 4371, 4373 
(U.S. April 19, 1983) (No. 81-2399) (emphasis in original). 
30 Id. 
31 403 F. Supp. 805 (E.D. Pa. 1975). 
32Id. at 817. See also Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park Comm'n v. EPA, 684 F.2d 1041, 
1046--47 (1st Cir. 1982) (agency's role in reviewing a privately-funded project is merely to 
determine whether the project is environmentally acceptable). In the coal slurry pipeline 
litigation, the District Court recently applied the Court's ruling in Metropolitan Edison to 
limit a competitor's discovery into the "economic viability" of the proposed project. See 
generally Missouri v. Andrews, No. CV82-L-442 (D. Neb. Nov. 3, 1983) (Memorandum and 
Order). Another District Court recently reached a similar result: 
The FE IS' treatment of the economic impacts of the South Bronx project goes well 
beyond the requirements of NEPA. In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in 
Metropolitan Edison, supra, which limited the impacts with which an agency must 
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Other cases involving private projects simply have not discussed 
whether an informal cost-benefit analysis must be included in EISs 
prepared for such projects. 33 However, in one case, Sierra Club v. 
Sigler,34 which involved the United States Army Corps of Engineers' 
approval for the planned private construction of a deepwater port, 
the court ruled that NEPA "mandates at least a broad, informal 
cost-benefit analysis. "35 In Sigler, the court failed to take note of the 
distinction between public and private projects, and therefore it 
should be limited to its unique facts. As a general matter, NEP A 
should not be stretched so far as to demand that private parties 
provide an economic justification for their proposed projects. 
Thus, as a general matter, EIS's should not stray from an analysis 
of environmental impacts into an analysis of the economics of a 
proposed project. This principle should be applied especially strictly 
in privately-funded projects. In such cases, the commitment of funds 
to a project cannot be second-guessed by federal officials under the 
auspices of NEP A. To do so would convert an E IS study of potential 
environmental impacts into an intrusion into the economic underpin-
nings of a proposed private venture. 
B. Analysis of Alternatives 
NEPA explicitly requires that an EIS include some discussion of 
alternatives to proposed actions, as well as their potential environ-
mental impacts.36 In the case of a federally-initiated project, the 
required evaluation of alternatives provides a federal decisionmaker 
with an opportunity to require government actors to undertake an 
alternative course of conduct.37 
be concerned under NEPA to those which will occur in the physical environment, 
and in light of other case law holding that judicial review of the economic aspects of 
an EIS should be especially deferential, this Court finds that plaintiff has raised no 
issues as to the adequacy of the FEIS with respect to its analysis of the economic 
impacts of the South Bronx project. 
Gerosa Inc. v. Dole, 576 F. Supp. 344, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
33 Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park Comm'n v. EPA, 17 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2023 (1st 
Cir. 1982); Lake Erie Alliance for Protection of the Coastal Corridor v. Corps of Engineers, 
526 F. Supp. 1063, 1068 (W.D. Pa. 1981), afl'd mem., 707 F.2d 1392 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
104 S.Ct. 277 (1983) (court need insure only that agency considered environmental conse-
quences); Delaware Water Emergency Group v. Ransier, 18 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1208 
(E.D. Pa. 1981). 
34 18 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1649, 1665 (5th Cir. 1983). 
35 Id. 
36 See NEPA § 102(2)(C)(iii), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iii). 
37 See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 836 (D.C. Cir. 
1972). 
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However, once again, the traditional approach to NEP A compli-
ance presents a poor "fit" in the case of private projects. A corpo-
ration that has embarked upon an expensive project often is in no 
position to change plans in mid-stream and adopt an "alternative" 
approach involving requirements that may be beyond the corpora-
tion's technical competence or economic resources. To illustrate, the 
backers of a coal slurry pipeline project that have invested heavily 
in the technology that they intend to apply to the project cannot be 
expected to abandon the technology in favor of an "alternative" 
technology that they are unwilling or incapable of applying which 
has been identified by federal officials. Accordingly, the discussion 
of "alternatives" in an EIS for a private project should be much less 
extensive than the discussion that might be included in a public 
project. Instead, the goal of the EIS should simply be to inform the 
federal permitting authorities of the ramifications of a proposed 
private project, thereby enabling the decisionmaker to go forward 
with full knowledge of potential environmental impacts. 38 
Although courts have not squarely been faced with this issue, the 
theory is fully consistent with a traditional understanding of the 
alternatives analysis required by NEP A. Regulations promulgated 
by CEQ require that an agency conducting an EIS must "[r]igorously 
explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives, and for 
alternatives which were .eliminated from detailed study, briefly dis-
cuss the reasons for their having been eliminated. "39 In interpreting 
this regulation, the CEQ has noted that "[r]easonable alternatives 
include those that are practical or feasible from the technical and 
economic standpoint and using common sense, rather than simply 
desirable from the standpoint of the applicant. "40 
The principle that an extended discussion is not necessary if an 
alternative is not practical or feasible has been elaborated upon in 
the case law. First, the Court declared in Vermont Yankee Nuclear 
Power Corp. v. NRDC,41 that "[t]o make an impact statement some-
thing more than an exercise in frivolous boilerplate the notion of 
alternatives must be bounded by some notion of feasibility." The 
feasibility notion was also applied to a discussion of particular alter-
natives in Life of the Land v. Brinegar,42 where the plaintiffs chal-
38 For a concurring opinion, see, e.g., Lake Erie v. Army Corps of Engineers, 526 F. Supp. 
at 1069 ("The decision may be a complete blunder as long as it is a knowledgeable one."). 
39 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a) (1984). 
40 46 Fed. Reg. 18027 (March 23, 1981) (emphasis added). 
41 435 U.S. 519, 551 (1978). 
42 485 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961 (1974). 
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lenged the EIS for an airplane runway. Plaintiffs claimed that the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) did not present alternatives 
in their EIS. The court held that discussion of the alternatives was 
not necessary, because there was "nothing in the record to indicate 
that alternatives . . . are either reasonable or feasible alternatives 
in this case. "43 
The typical standard applied to alternatives analysis is that the 
discussion "need not be exhaustive," but rather provide "information 
sufficient to permit a reasoned choice of alternatives so far as envi-
ronmental aspects are concerned." This standard was originally ar-
ticulated in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton,44 where 
an EIS conducted by the Department of Interior (DOl) for oil and 
gas lease sales was challenged on the ground that it did not include 
sufficient discussion of alternatives. Although the Eighth Circuit 
affirmed the lower court's ruling that more discussion was necessary 
for many of the alternatives, it found that the DOl's treatment in 
the EIS of certain new technologies was sufficient: 
We think there is merit to the Government's position insofar as 
it contends that no additional discussion was requisite for such 
"alternatives" as the development of oil shale, desulfurization of 
coal, coal liquefaction and gasification, tar sands and geothermal 
resources. The Statement sets forth . . . that while these pos-
sibilities hold great promise for the future, their impact on the 
energy supply will not likely be felt until after 1980, and will be 
dependent upon environmental safeguards and technilogical [sic] 
developments .... [T]he possibility of the environmental impact 
of long-term solutions requires no additional discussion at this 
juncture. 45 
The Court also found that no detailed discussion was required where 
the environmental effects of the alternatives "cannot be readily as-
certained and the alternatives are deemed only remote and specu-
lative possibilities. "46 
Applying these traditional principles to the non-traditional case 
where a project analyzed in an EIS is financed solely by a private 
43Id. at 471. See also Kentucky v. Alexander, 655 F.2d 714, 719 (6th Cir. 1981) (brief 
discussion of alternatives to a port site in EIS found sufficient where both EIS and adminis-
trative record indicate that they were not feasible). 
44 458 F.2d at 836. See also Farmland Preservation Ass'n V. Goldschmidt, 611 F.2d 233, 239 
(8th Cir. 1979); Robinson V. Knebel, 550 F.2d 422, 425 (8th Cir. 1977). 
45 Natural Resources Defense Council, 458 F.2d at 837. 
46 I d. at 838. 
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party,47 courts should define narrowly the alternatives that must be 
analyzed in an EIS. As noted above, a large project cannot be 
uprooted and changed in mid-stream as a practical matter. For ex-
ample, a coal slurry pipeline cannot have its route changed, after 
rights-of-way have been purchased. Nor can the developer be forced 
to apply a technology that its backers do not support. 
In such cases, the primary goal of the EIS - as always - is to 
make a federal decisionmaker aware of the potential environmental 
implications of a proposed project.48 The permitting authority may 
require mitigating measures, but it may not force a private party to 
change fundamentally the nature of a project. NEPA is designed to 
improve the informational base of decisionmakers, but not to force 
the decisionmaker's or applicant's hand. As a result, the discussion 
of alternatives included in an EIS for a private project need not be 
extensive, and it should not be used as the basis for attempting to 
force a private party to change the nature of its proposed project. 
III. STANDING TO CHALLENGE EISs PREPARED FOR PRIVATE 
PROJECTS 
Corporations that undertake large development projects fre-
quently are sued by their competitors who attempt to use NEP A to 
delay, or, preferably, to kill a project. In such circumstances, it is 
obvious that the competitor's interest in initiating the suit is moti-
vated by economic and not environmental concerns.49 Nonetheless, 
based on early court decisions resulting from suits initiated by en-
vironmental groups, some courts have been reluctant to question 
the motives of plaintiffs in NEP A suits. 50 This judicial approach has 
begun to change. In a recent decision rendered by the Chief Judge 
in the District Court of Nebraska, in a case involving a railroad's 
challenge to a coal slurry pipeline project, the court demanded that 
47 No statistical analysis has been completed that compares the relative number of EIS's 
prepared for public versus private projects, but the vast majority of NEPA cases reported 
by the courts involved government projects. This fact, combined with the fact that NEPA 
originally was intended to apply to government projects (see supra notes 4 & 5), suggests 
that a privately-funded project involves a "non-traditional" case. 
48 See supra n.37 and accompanying text. 
49 The tendency of competitors to use the courts as a means of injuring competitors has 
drawn the interest of the Federal Trade Commission, which has initiated an investigation into 
abuses of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. See FTC Scrutinizes Unusual Corners for Preda-
tion, LEGAL TIMES Aug. 26, 1985, at 1, col. 3. 
50 See, e.g., Monarch Chemical Works, Inc. v. Exon, 452 F. Supp. 493, 501 (D. Neb. 1978), 
aff'd sub nom. Monarch Chemical Works, Inc. v. Thone, 604 F.2d 1083 (8th Cir. 1979). 
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competitors evidence more than a mere economic interest in order 
to have standing under NEP A.51 
The discussion that follows reviews the traditional principles of 
standing, and then discusses their application in NEPA cases in-
volving corporate competitors' challenges to private projects. The 
section concludes that courts should not tolerate such suits, and 
should readily dismiss them for lack of standing. 
A. Traditional Standing Principles 
Before any party has standing to challenge the legality of an 
administrative action, that party must demonstrate that it has suf-
fered (1) "injury in fact" and (2) that the interest injured is "arguably 
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the 
statute .... "52 As one Circuit has summarized: 
The present test for standing is twofold: whether the challenged 
action has caused plaintiff injury in fact and whether that injury 
was to an interest arguably within the zone of interests to be 
protected or regulated by the statutes that the agencies were 
claimed to have violated. See United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 
669, 686 (1973); Adolphus v. Zebelman, 486 F.2d 1323, 1325-26 
(8th Cir. 1973).53 
The requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate "injury in fact" is a 
constitutional limitation on federal jurisdiction. Complainants are 
thus assured to "have the personal stake and interest that impart 
the concrete adverseness required by Article III."54 Without a show-
ing by the plaintiff of injury in fact, a case or controversy does not 
exist. 55 The constitutional requirement of "injury in fact" cannot be 
satisfied simply by asserting that the government has acted unlaw-
fully, and that the plaintiff has an interest in the subject matter of 
the government's actions. The United States Supreme Court has 
held that "it is the responsibility of the complainant clearly to allege 
facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial 
resolution of the dispute and the exercise of the court's remedial 
powers. "56 
51 See Missouri v. Andrews, No. CV82-L-442 (D. Neb. March 7, 1984) (Memorandum on 
Standing Issues). 
62 Association of Data Processing Service Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-153 (1970). 
See also Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 164 (1970). 
63 Coalition for the Env't v. Volpe, 504 F.2d 156, 165 (8th Cir. 1974). 
64 Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. at 164. 
55 See Adolphus v. Zebelman, 486 F.2d 1323, 1325-26 (8th Cir. 1973). 
56 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518 (1975) (emphasis added). 
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In addition, a showing of "injury in fact" is not, by itself, sufficient 
to confer standing on a party. The Article III requirement that a 
case or controversy be present is only satisfied when a plaintiff can 
demonstrate that the alleged "injury in fact" can be redressed by 
the statute invoked by plaintiffs. A plaintiff must therefore demon-
strate that its alleged injury falls within the "zone of interests" of 
the statute under which the plaintiff seeks relief. 57 
B. Requisites of Standing in NEPA Cases - The Need to 
Establish Environmental Injury-In-Fact 
NEP A protects a "zone of interest" that encompasses the envi-
ronmental impacts of projects. 58 Since NEPA protects environmental 
interests, plaintiffs who base their claims on NEPA violations must 
demonstrate that they have suffered, or are suffering environmental 
injury-in-fact before their claims fall within NEPA's "zone of inter-
ests." Accordingly, courts have ruled that when plaintiffs allege 
purely economic interests, they do not have standing to raise NEPA 
challenges. It is clear that plaintiffs' economic injuries do not fall 
within the scope of interests protected by NEPA.59 
Consistent with this authority, courts have denied standing to 
plaintiffs who bring NEPA-based actions even though their injury 
57 As the Supreme Court recently elaborated in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans 
United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982): "[T]he requirements of 
Art. III [of the United States Constitution] are not satisfied merely because a party requests 
a court of the United States to declare its legal rights, and has couched that request for forms 
of relief historically associated with courts of law in terms that have a familiar ring to those 
trained in the legal process." Id. at 471. Instead, "Art. III requires the party who invokes 
the court's authority to 'show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury 
as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant .... '" Id. at 472. Accord, 
Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979) ("The constitutional limits 
on standing eliminate claims in which the plaintiff has failed to make out a case or controversy 
between himself and the defendant. In order to satisfy Art. III, the plaintiff must show that 
he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal 
conduct of the defendant. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envt'l Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 
72 (1978); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 260-61 (1977); 
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973). Otherwise, the 
exercise of federal jurisdiction 'would be gratuitous and thus inconsistent with the Art. III 
limitation.' Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., supra, at 38."). 
58 See Benton County Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 450 F. 
Supp. 884, 890 (W.D. Ark. 1978) ("the purpose of the National Environmental Policy Act is 
to prevent and eliminate damage to the environment"). 
59 See generally Clinton Community Hospital Corp. v. Southern Maryland Medical Center, 
374 F. Supp. 450, 455 (D. Md. 1974), aff'd, 510 F.2d 1037 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 
U.S. 1048 (1975). 
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is economic and not environmental. For example, in Churchill Truck 
Lines, Inc. v. United States,60 a trucking company attempted to 
challenge Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) trucking rates 
based on the Commission's failure to prepare an environmental im-
pact statement. The court found that the trucking company lacked 
standing to raise environmental issues because the company's sole 
motivation in challenging the Commission's actions was economic: 
Petitioners, whose sole motivation in this case was their own 
economic self-interest and welfare, are singularly inappropriate 
parties to be entrusted with the responsibility of asserting the 
public's environmental interest in proceedings concerning the 
issuance of operating authority to motor carriers. Petitioners do 
not allege any environmental injury to themselves. Their interest 
in their economic well-being vis-a-vis their competitors is clearly 
not within the zone of interests to be protected by the National 
Environmental Policy Act . . . . This Act was not designed to 
prevent loss of profits but was intended to promote governmental 
awareness of and action concerning environmental problems. 61 
Other courts have followed the lead of Churchill by denying stand-
ing to plaintiffs who have alleged only economic interests in NEPA-
based suits. In United States v. 255.25 Acres of Land,62 the court 
noted that landowners challenging certain condemnation proceedings 
did not have standing to raise environmental claims: 
[T]he landowners here made no allegations of harm to the envi-
ronment, have alleged no interest in the environment and have 
made no claim as to being within the zone of interests protected 
by NEPA; nor do they allege any injury to themselves within 
the scope of NEPA or the other Acts. 63 
Other courts have agreed that NEPA "simply was not meant to be 
used as a device whereby plaintiffs with strictly economic interests 
would be allowed to thwart governmental activity under the guise 
of environmental interest" merely "by invoking the magic word 'en-
vironment' when their injury has factually nothing to do with the 
environment. "64 
60 533 F.2d 411 (8th Cir. 1976). 
61 [d. at 416 (emphasis added). 
62 553 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1977). 
63 533 F.2d at 572 n.2. Accord, Benton County Savings & Loan Ass'n, 450 F. Supp. at 890 
("plaintiffs' sole motivation in this case is their own economic self interest and welfare"). 
64 Hiatt Grain & Feed, Inc. v. Bergland, 446 F. Supp. 457, 487-88 (D. Kan. 1978), aff'd, 
608 F.2d 929 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980) ("It is not the Congressional 
intent that the National Environmental Policy Act protect persons whose sole motivation is 
their own economic self interest and welfare"); Cummington Preservation Comm. v. ·F AA, 8 
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Despite this strong and persuasive authority, some courts have 
been reluctant to dismiss economic competitors in NEP A suits for 
lack of standing due to their reluctance to ascribe purely economic 
motives to a plaintiff. Some courts also have indicated that NEPA 
involves a general "informational" interest in the content of an EIS. 
As recently explained by the District Court in Nebraska, however, 
this "interest" does not permit an economically-motivated plaintiff 
to manufacture the requisite injury-in-fact needed to initiate a NEPA 
suit: 
Environmental Defense Fund v. March, 651 F.2d 983, 999, n.20 
(5th Cir. 1981), and South Louisiana Environmental Council, 
Inc. v. Sand, 629 F.2d 1005, 1011 (5th Cir. 1980), do say that a 
plaintiff can challenge the accuracy of any statements made in 
an environmental statement, but neither case used this principle 
to grant standing to someone whose economic interests might 
be harmed because erroneous information in the impact state-
ment would affect a federal official's decision. In both cases, the 
plaintiffs already had standing to challenge the cost-benefit anal-
ysis used in the statement, and the courts were commenting on 
the extent to which they could use their standing. Environmental 
impact statements frequently discuss economic issues, and the 
[plaintiff's proposed] rule would give standing to many plaintiffs 
whose interests were purely economic. . . .65 
In Robinson v. Knebel,66 the plaintiff was granted standing be-
cause at least some of the motivation for the suit was based on 
environmental concerns. The court stated: 
[ilndividuals motivated in part by protection of their own pecu-
niary interest can challenge administrative action under NEPA 
provided that their environmental concerns are not so insignifi-
cant that they ought to be disregarded altogether. 67 
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1121, 1123 (D. Mass. 1975); Brooks v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 269, 277 
(W.D. Wash. 1972), supplemented at 350 F. Supp. 287, aff'd, 487 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1973) 
("Emotional environmentalism must be tempered with rational realism. Litigants must not 
be allowed to use NEP A as a tool to destroy federal programs under the guise of interest in 
the environment. "). 
65 See Missouri v. Andrews, supra note 50, at 10. See also id. at 12. 
66 550 F.2d 422 (8th Cir. 1977). 
67Id. at 425. See also Monarch Chemical Works, Inc., 452 F. Supp. at 501; Mobil Oil v. 
FTC, 430 F. Supp. 855, 863 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 562 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1977); 
National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971). The Nebraska District Court 
recently limited the holding of the Robinson, National Helium and Monarch Chemical cases 
as follows: 
In Robinson, the plaintiffs owned land and lived within a proposed development area. 
They were given standing to challenge an environmental impact statement on the 
proposed development because the development would harm them economically and 
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The minority of courts that have declined to dismiss suits brought 
by corporations whose suits were obviously attempts to use NEP A 
to pursue their economic interests have invited abuse of NEP A, as 
well as the judicial system. Courts should vigorously apply standing 
principles to ensure that the judicial system is not clogged with 
economic dog-fights hidden behind "environmental" disguises. 
Rather, courts should adopt the reasoning recently applied by Chief 
Judge Urbom in Missouri v. Andrews.68 In that case, the plaintiff 
Kansas City Southern Railway's allegedly "environmental" challenge 
to a coal slurry pipeline project was rejected. 69 In so holding, Judge 
U rbom refused to allow the plaintiff to convert its claims of potential 
economic injury into an "environmental" injury. As summarized by 
the court, such speculative, generalized claims will not satisfy stand-
ing requirements: 
The sole injury-in-fact which the railroad adequately has 
pleaded is an economic one: the loss of revenues from transport-
ing coal. This interest is not within the zone of interests pro-
tected by NEPA. The railroad argues, however, that the poten-
tial diversion of large amounts of Missouri River water to a 
slurry pipeline would reduce production of irrigated crops and 
thus reduce KeS's revenues from grain transportation, the con-
environmentally (they had alleged the loss of their farmland and hunting land, dam-
ages from constant water seepage, and damages from increased traffic and conges-
tion). 550 F.2d at 425. In National Helium, several helium manufacturers challenged 
the government's decision to stop purchasing helium. They were motivated by their 
own pecuniary interest in selling helium, but the court said that they had also 
implicated an environmental injury. Helium is produced when natural gas is ex-
tracted, and the plaintiffs pointed out that if the government did not buy it, the gas 
would be vented into the air and wasted, unnecessarily depleting the nation's helium 
resources. 455 F.2d at 653. The court said this was a sufficient environmental threat 
to give the plaintiffs standing. In both Robinson and National Helium the environ-
mental interests of the plaintiffs would have been harmed directly .... [See also] 
Monarch Chemical Works, Inc. v. Exon, 452 F. Supp. 493, 499 (U.S.D.C. Neb. 
1978), aff'd, 604 F.2d 1083 (8th Cir. 1979) (although plaintiff would suffer primarily 
economic harm, it also alleged that it would suffer increased air and noise pollution 
from construction). 
68 Missouri v. Andrews, supra note 50, at 9. While these cases can be distinguished, as 
noted above, their continuing vitality must be questioned in view of the courts' increasing 
unwillingness to tolerate economically-motivated NEPA suits. 
69 In the Andrews case, there was little doubt that the suit was motivated by economics. 
Indeed, the Kansas City Southern Railway admitted in its Complaint that it relied heavily on 
coal transportation for a large portion of its revenue and that it was concerned that the coal 
slurry pipeline would threaten that revenue. Indeed, after the ETSI pipeline project was 
delayed in 1984, ETSI filed an antitrust case against the Kansas City Southern Railroad and 
other railroads for concerted actions designed to scuttle the coal slurry project, including 
initiation of the Andrews case. See ETSI Pipeline Project v. Burlington Northern Inc., No. 
B-84-979 (E.D. Tex.). 
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tention being that damage to the environment is intertwined 
with an economic injury to the railroad. 
This is not sufficient .... [T]he railroad's claims of reduced 
grain transportation revenues are too speculative to constitute 
an injury-in-fact, and its expressions of a general interest in the 
"natural, economic and socio-economic environment of the area 
proposed for the project" are subject to the same problems which 
led the Supreme Court to deny standing in Sierra Club v. Mor-
ton. 70 
The same reasoning was applied by the District Court in Kaiser 
Cement Corporation v. Stockton Port District71 to dismis~ suits that 
domestic cement manufacturers brought to block construction of 
harbor facilities designed to accept cement imports. In Kaiser Ce-
ment, the cement manufacturers attempted to base their suits on 
environmental grounds, despite the obvious economic motivation 
behind the suits. 72 
Thus, some courts have begun to scrutinize more carefully the 
standing of economic competitors to bring suits that allege violations 
of NEP A. In view of the abuses of NEP A and the judicial system 
presented by such suits, courts should readily dismiss such potential 
aggrieved competitors for lack of standing under NEPA. 
C. Third Party Standing 
Generally speaking, a party seeking relief from a federal court 
"must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his 
claim to relief," or his standing, for that matter, "on the legal rights 
or interests of third parties. "73 A narrow exception to this rule exists 
for organizations that can satisfy a three-part standing test set forth 
by the Court in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Com-
mission. 74 Under that test, where an organization attempts to es-
tablish its own standing to bring an action based on its employees' 
or members' interests, it must first demonstrate that its employees 
would have standing to sue in their own right; second, that the 
employees' interests are germane to the organization's purpose; and 
third, that neither the claims asserted, nor the relief requested, 
70 Missouri v. Andrews, supra note 50, at 8. 
71 See Kaiser Cement Corp. v. Stockton Port District, Civ. No. S-81-146 PCW (E.D. Cal. 
Sept. 15, 1982) (unpublished). 
72 [d. 
73 Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 474 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 
499). 
74 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). 
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requires the participation of individual employees in the lawsuit. 75 
These requirements are cumulative; an organization's failure to sat-
isfy anyone requirement negates the organization's standing to bring 
a case on behalf of its employees or members. 76 
When competitors attempt to block projects on NEPA grounds, 
they typically invoke their employees' interests and those of other 
third parties to establish that the environmental injury-in-fact re-
quirement is satisfied. To illustrate, in the Andrews case, the Kansas 
City Southern Railway asserted that its employees had a strong 
interest in the environment, and that its employees' interest might 
be injured by the proposed coal slurry project. 77 
Under the principles set forth above, this ploy should not be 
permitted as a means of bootstrapping standing obligations. Under 
the Hunt test, the corporate plaintiff's alleged environmental inter-
ests are rarely germane to the organization's purpose. An exami-
nation of a plaintiff corporation's Articles of Incorporation typically 
confirms that the company is not dedicated to protecting the envi-
ronment from potential harm. 
Judge Urbom's recent standing decision in Andrews applied this 
doctrine to dismiss the plaintiff's NEPA claims in a suit against a 
coal slurry pipeline venture. The court explained: 
The railroad cannot represent the interests of its employees 
on these issues. It is clear that an organization whose members 
are injured may represent those members in a proceeding for 
judicial review . . . . However, it can do so only if its members 
otherwise have standing to sue in their own right, the interests 
the organization seeks to protect are germane to its organiza-
tional purposes, and neither the claim asserted nor the relief 
requested requires the participation of individual members in 
the lawsuit .... It is not clear that the employees of KCS have 
standing to sue in their own right, because the pleadings do not 
sufficiently link any adverse environmental harms to them. 
Moreover, the organizational purpose of Kansas City Southern 
is to operate a railroad; there is no indication that its official 
purposes include protecting the environment. 78 
75 433 U.S. at 343. Accord, National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Califano, 622 F.2d 1382, 
1387-92 (10th Cir. 1980); Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391, 398 n.7 (5th Cir. 1980); 
Associated Gen. Contractors v. Otter Tail Power Co., 611 F.2d 684, 690-91 (8th Cir. 1979). 
76 See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 320-21 (1980) (failure to satisfy third require-
ment negates plaintiff's standing); Associated Gen. Contractors, 611 F.2d at 690-91 (failure 
to satisfy second and third requirements negates plaintiff's standing). 
77 See, e.g., Complaint ~ 6, Kansas City Southern Railway Co. v. Andrews, No. CV-82-L-
443 (D. Neb. Oct. 7, 1982). 
78 Missouri v. Andrews, supra note 50 at 7 (citations omitted). 
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Courts should follow the lead of Andrews and strictly apply third-
party standing requirements in NEPA cases initiated by competi-
tors. As explained above, NEP A's application to privately-funded 
projects should be more limited than its application to federally-
financed projects. Moreover, courts should not permit NEPA to be 
used as the vehicle for competitors' attempts to scuttle projects on 
the pretense of their employees' environmental concern, when their 
true concern is that the project may adversely affect their economic 
postures. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As the development of natural resources shifts from federally-
financed projects to privately-funded projects, courts increasingly 
will be faced with NEPA suits that do not fall neatly into traditional 
analytical frameworks. In such cases, courts must not be reluctant 
to take a new approach that recognizes the special circumstances 
presented by private projects. In particular, courts should not re-
quire that developers prepare an EIS for private projects that in-
cludes the same type of analysis mandated for publicly-funded proj-
ects. Neither a cost-benefit analysis nor a full-blown discussion of 
alternatives is appropriate for private projects. In addition, courts 
must not construe standing requirements loosely and permit busi-
ness competitors who are interested in the economic (and not the 
environmental) impacts of privately-funded projects to prosecute 
suits under NEP A. To preserve NEP A's goals of protecting envi-
ronmental and not economic interests, courts must take into consid-
eration the nature of the project when applying NEP A's require-
ments to it. 
